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The international literature on minimum wage greatly lacks empirical evidence from developing countries.  In 
Brazil, not only are increases in the minimum wage large and frequent but also the minimum wage has been used as 
anti-inflation policy in addition to its social role.  This paper estimates the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment using monthly household data from 1982 to 2000 aggregated at regional level.  A number of conceptual 
and identification questions is discussed as tentative explanation of the non-negative estimates found in the 
literature, for example:  (1) The use of political variables as excluded exogenous instruments for the minimum wage 
variable; (2) The superiority of “spike” over “fraction affected” and “Kaitz index” as a minimum wage variable; (3) 
The decomposition of the minimum wage employment effect into hours worked and number of jobs effects; (4) 
Robustness checks accounting for sorting into informal and public sectors.  Robust results to various alternative 
specifications and instrumental variables indicate that an increase in the minimum wage has moderately small 
adverse effects on employment. 
 









1 At University College London (s.lemos@ucl.ac.uk).  Special thanks to Arthur Van Soest, Ashley Stephenson, 
Christian Dustman, Coen Teulings, Costas Meghir, Donald Verry, Fabio Soares, Frank Windmeijer, Jerzy Szroeter, 
Keith Ball, Miguel Foguel, Otavio Amorim Neto, Ron Smith, and Steve Machin.  Thanks for email correspondence 
to Alan Krueger, Dave Wittenburg, Daniel Hamermesh, David Brown, David Neumark, John Bound, Kenneth 
Couch, Madeleine Zavodny, Michael Baker, and Nicolas Williams.  Also thanks to comments of various participants 
in the following conferences: IZA-Germany, ESPE-Germany, SPiE-Lisbon, SOLE-America, ESPE-Spain, EEA-
Italy, LAMES-Brazil, and LACEA-Spain.  There is currently not much consensus on the direction of the employment effects of the 
minimum wage.  The old debate between Stigler (1946) and Lester (1946), dormant since the early 
80s in an apparent consensus of negative significant but modest effects on employment (Brown, 
Gilroy and Kohen, 1982) has been re-awakened.  On the one hand, Neumark and Wascher (1992) 
and Deere et al. (1995), among others, find results consistent with the standard model prediction of a 
negative employment effect.  On the other hand, Card and Krueger (1995) and Dickens et al. (1999), 
among others, challenge such a prediction, unable to find disemployment effects.  Explanations to 
non-negative effects range from theory to empirical identification and data issues (Card and Krueger, 
1995; Brown, 1999).  In a recent survey, Brown (1999, p.2154) remarks:  “the minimum-wage effect 
is small (and zero is often hard to reject)”.  While there is yet no consensus, small employment 
effects, clustered around zero, are becoming prevalent in the literature (Freeman, 1994 and 1996; 
Brown, 1999).  
In studies for Brazil, in line with the international empirical literature, an increase in the 
minimum wage does not always have a significant effect on employment and it is not always 
negative, despite sizeable wage effects (Camargo, 1984; Velloso, 1988; Neri, 1997; Carneiro, 2000; 
Carneiro, 2002; Corseuil and Servo, 2002).  Using national aggregate data, this literature estimates 
average wage and employment effects imposing restrictions on time modeling, i.e. relying on the so-
called ad hoc identification predominant in the early time series literature.  This paper estimates the 
effects of the minimum wage on employment using panel data techniques and monthly Brazilian 
household data from 1982 to 2000 aggregated at regional level.  It contributes to the extant literature 
in a number of ways.   
First, it utilizes data only recently released for the public and not yet used for minimum wage 
studies.  The international literature on minimum wage is scanty on non-US empirical evidence.  
This paper estimates minimum wage effects for a key non-US example.  There are compelling 
reasons to study the minimum wage outside the US.  “No single empirical study of an economic 
phenomenon is ever highly convincing” (Hamermesh, 2002, p. 4).   Many data points are needed - 
many and independent data points are needed.  Using non-US data is an unbiased way of extending 
the understanding of minimum wage effects and assessing the robustness of findings for the US.  
Hamermesh (2002, p. 15) argues for increased reliance on non-US data and policy evaluations: 
“policies like hours legislation and the minimum wage provide especially fruitful areas in which to 
apply the results of studying foreign experiences to the US”.     
Furthermore, Hamermesh (2002) calls attention for the evidence from developing countries, 
which is greatly lacking in the literature.  Minimum wage increases in Brazil are large and frequent, 
unlike the typically small increases studied in most of the literature (Deere et al, 1996; Hamermesh, 
2002; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman, 1992).  Studying such increases allows a better possibility of 
observing the negative effects predicted by theory and thus the link between empirical data and 
theoretical models of the minimum wage.  Furthermore, Hamermesh (2002) remarks that foreign 
experiences are especially fruitful if they generate exogenous shocks (an alternative to reliance on 
statistical methods to circumvent the problems arising from endogeneity), as in Brazil over the past 
30 years.  Moreover, special features of the Brazilian Economy are valuable for case studies of the 
minimum wage in presence of: a (low) high inflation; a public sector and a large informal sector 
both overpopulated by minimum wage workers; and a strong link between benefits and pensions 
with the minimum wage.  This unique data is a result of the important role the minimum wage plays 
in Brazil, where it has been used as an anti-inflation policy in addition to its traditional social role 
(Macedo and Garcia, 1978, 1980; Camargo, 1984; Foguel, 1997; Carneiro, 2000). 
Second, this paper discusses a number of conceptual and identification questions as tentative 
explanations of the non-negative employment effects found in the literature.  For example:   
  1 (1) A national minimum wage cannot explain variation in employment across regions (Brown et al., 
1982; Card and Krueger, 1995).  Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from 
the effect of other variables on employment requires regional variation if no restriction on time 
modeling is imposed.  This motivates the use of “spike” as a minimum wage variable, which is here 
argued to be superior to the commonly used “Kaitz index” and “fraction affected”.   
(2) The minimum wage variable and employment might be simultaneously determined.   
Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of unobserved variables 
on employment requires consistent estimation if such endogeneity bias is to be corrected for.  Put 
differently, rather than capturing a descriptive relationship - which asks: if a person is taken at 
random from the population, what is his/her expected hours of work, given the level of the minimum 
wage? - the instrumented model captures a behavioural relationship - which asks:  if the same person 
is taken from the population, knowing which region he/she comes from (i.e., controlling for observed 
and unobserved regional effects), and the minimum wage is increased by 1%, by how much would 
his/her hours of work be expected to increase/decrease?  This paper suggests a number of political 
variables – not previously suggested in the literature - as excluded exogenous instruments to control 
for the endogeneity of the minimum wage variable.  
(3)  Identification of the effect of the minimum wage separately from the effect of unobserved 
regional macro fixed effects on employment requires modeling fixed effects.  This paper uses panel 
data techniques, scarcely used in the minimum wage literature, to account for this.   
(4) This paper formalizes an employment decomposition that separately estimates the effect of the 
minimum wage on hours worked and on the number of jobs; if the first is positive and the second is 
negative, this could be an explanation of non-negative (total) employment effects.  Such 
decomposition has not been previously formalized in the literature.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the data.  Section 3 describes the 
minimum wage in Brazil (Section 3.1) and discusses “spike” as the minimum wage variable (Section 
3.2).  Section 4 estimates descriptive models.  Section 5 discusses identification: lags of the 
endogenous variable are used as instruments under the assumption of errors serially uncorrelated 
(Section 5.1); and political variables are used instead as exogenous excluded instruments when this 
assumption is relaxed (Section 5.2).  Robust results indicate moderately small employment effects. 
 
2. DATA 
The data used is from PME (Monthly Employment Survey), a rotating panel data similar to the 
US CPS (Current Population Survey).  Between 1982 and 2000, PME interviewed over 21 million 
people across the six main Brazilian metropolitan regions:  Bahia (BA), Pernambuco (PE), Rio de 
Janeiro (RJ), Sao Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais (MG) and Rio Grande do Sul (RS).  Its monthly 
periodicity is important because wage bargains during the sample period occurred annually, bi-
annually, quarterly and even monthly, depending on the inflation level and indexation rules.   
Comparisons of demographic and economic characteristics across regions or waves show no 
selectivity bias in any direction (Neri, 1996).  The deflator, INPC (National Consumers Price Index), 
was regionally disaggregated to reduce measurement error. 
 
3. MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLES  
3.1 MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL 
The minimum wage was introduced in 1940 as a social policy to provide subsistence income 
(diet, transport, clothing, and hygiene) for an adult worker.  The associated bundle varied across 
  2 regions, which was reflected in 14 minimum wages - the highest (lowest) for the Southeast 
(Northeast) (Gonzaga and Machado, 2002). Wells (1983, p. 305) believes they were “generous 
relative to existing standards” since about 60% to 70% of workers earned below them; Saboia (1984) 
and Oliveira (1981) believe they legitimated the low wages of the unskilled.   
The real minimum wage was decreased over time because of two main reasons.  The first one 
has been the failure in adjustments to keep pace with inflation.  After a steep decrease, the real 
minimum wage was adjusted and reached its peak during the boom of the 50s, when productivity 
was high, unions strong, and the Government populist.  After that, it decreased as a result of the 
subsequent recession, rising inflation, and non-aggressive unions (Singer, 1975).  The real minimum 
wage was then 40% lower than in the 50s.   
The minimum wage social role changed when the dictatorship installed in 1964 associated high 
inflation with wage adjustments.  Nominal minimum wage increases can be inflationary because 
they affect production costs and prices, not only through its direct effect on minimum wage workers, 
but also through indirect spillover effects (Brown, 1999).  The dictatorship limited labour 
organization, reduced wage militancy, and implemented a centralized wage policy.  One of the 
strategies of this policy was under-indexation of the real minimum wage, via erosion of the nominal 
minimum wage (Macedo and Garcia, 1978), which transformed the latter “from a social policy 
designed to protect the worker’s living standard into an instrument for stabilization policy” 
(Camargo, 1984, p.19).  The “Teoria do Farol” (Lighthouse Effect) associated the subsequent 
increase in inequality revealed in the 1970 Census with the pos-64 real minimum wage decrease 
(Souza and Baltar, 1979, 1980a and 1980b).   
According to Carneiro and Faria (1998), the nominal minimum wage was used not only as a 
stabilization policy but also as a coordinator of the wage policy.  One example is that other wages 
were set as multiples of the minimum wage.  Another example is that in the early 80s, wages in the 
range 1 to 3 minimum wages were bi-annually adjusted by 110% of the inflation rate; the higher the 
worker’s position in the wage distribution, the lower the percentage adjustment.  Such increases 
immediately spilled over higher up the wage distribution; its effects were no longer limited to the 
bottom of the distribution as when it plays a social role.  More generally, the minimum wage played 
an indexer role.  In the presence of high inflation and distorted relative prices, rational agents took 
increases in the minimum wage as a signal for price and wage bargains - even after law forbade its 
use as “numeraire” in 1987.  Minimum wage indexation and reinforced inflationary expectations was 
a phenomenon first noticed by Gramlich (1976), Cox and Oaxaca (1981), and Wolf and Nadiri 
(1981); and more recently discussed by Card and Krueger (1995) and Freeman (1996).  Maloney and 
Nunes (2003) show that the “Efeito Farol” and the “numeraire” effect are a general phenomenon in 
Latin America. 
The second main reason for the decrease of the real minimum wage over time has been its 
impact on the public deficit - uncontrollably large and growing in the 80s and 90s - via benefits, 
pensions, and the Government wage bill.
2  This impact has often been the criterion for the affordable 
increase in the nominal minimum wage, resulting in under-indexation of the real minimum wage.  
Because of its effects both on prices and on the public deficit, the under-indexation of the real 
minimum wage (by erosion of the nominal minimum wage) was used as a deflationary policy.   
However, when pressure was enough, the Government had to give in, allowing increases in the 
nominal minimum wage - the nominal minimum wage became the “messenger” of the inflation - 
which in turn severely affected both prices and the public deficit and were therefore inflationary.  
This effect was perpetuated in an inflation spiral.  The anti-inflation policy became inflationary 
                                                            
2 In the sample period, 12% of the population are pensioners, 7% are civil servants. 
  3 itself; the remedy became the disease.  In this context, the minimum wage has been alternately used 
as social and anti-inflation policy.  The policy choice depended (a) on the level of inflation, (b) on 
the bargaining power of the workers, and (c) on the party affiliation of the Government (Velloso, 
1988; Bacha, 1979).  The social role is associated with more populist Governments, lower inflation, 
and stronger unions.  
Graph 1.a shows that the hourly real minimum wage decreased between 1982 and 2000.  Its 
highest (lowest) level was in November 1982 (August 1991), before the acceleration of inflation.  In 
political terms, three events were important in the 80s: (a) in 1984, the minimum wage became 
national, after slow regional convergence; (b) with the end of the military regime in 1985, the 1988 
Constitution re-defined the subsistence income (diet, accommodation, education, health, leisure, 
clothing, hygiene, transport, and retirement) for an adult worker and his/her family - even though 
such a bundle was unaffordable at the prevalent minimum wage; (c) the union movement re-emerged 
and became ever stronger, reaching a high union density for a developing country (Carneiro and 
Henley, 1998; Amadeo and Camargo, 1993).  In economic terms, despite the political changes, the 
minimum wage was still a component of the centralized wage policy.  The 80s and 90s witnessed an 
exhausting battle against inflation.  Five stabilization plans between 1986 and 1994 had different 
nominal minimum wage indexation rules depending on the inflation level.  Since then, under 
reasonably stable inflation, the minimum wage has not been explicitly used as an anti-inflation 
policy. 
The steady decrease of the real minimum wage over time suggests a move downwards along the 
labour demand curve.  It is then not surprising that minimum wage employment effects in Brazil are 
non-negative (Lemos, 2003a and 2003c; Carneiro, 2000; Foguel, 1997; Neri, 1997; Amadeo et al., 
1995; Camargo, 1984), despite sizeable wage effects.  Graph 2 plots log employment rate against log 
real minimum wage suggesting a non-negative relationship between the two.  Furthermore, Lemos 
(2003b) shows evidence of full pass-through effect of the minimum wage on prices in Brazil.   
Evidence of large wage effects, large price effects and small employment effects is consistent with 
an inelastic labour demand curve and a particularly rapid wage-price spiral under high inflation (note 
saw-toothed pattern in Graph 1a).  Firms anticipate the wage-price spiral - encountering little 
resistance to upward prices adjustment, as nominal stickiness is smaller the higher inflation (Layard 
et al., 1991) - and do not adjust employment to avoid adjustment costs.   
 
3.2 MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLES  
Within a month, the minimum wage is a constant and therefore cannot explain variations in 
employment across regions.  The real minimum wage varies across regions simply because the 
nominal minimum wage has been deflated with regional deflators.  This variation cannot be regarded 
as genuine, as it is completely driven by the variation in the deflators; the effect of the inverse of the 
deflator on employment is what is ultimately estimated (Welch and Cunningham, 1978; Freeman, 
1982).  In other words, once the numerator is constant, the variation in the deflator is what drives the 
estimated impact of the ratio on employment.  Lacking genuine regional variation, identification 
depends on how time is modeled - the so-called ad hoc identification predominant in the early 
minimum wage literature.   
Identification requires regional variation if no restriction on time is imposed.  Many minimum 
wage variables with such a regional variation have been suggested in the literature.  (1) The typically 
used is “Kaitz index” (Kaitz, 1970), defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage 
adjusted for coverage of the legislation.  The Kaitz index varies across regions and over time, but the 
above criticism applies because the variation in average wages is what drives the estimated impact of 
  4 the ratio on employment.  (2) Another minimum wage variable suggested in the literature is “fraction 
affected”, defined as the proportion of people earning a wage between the old and the new minimum 
wage (Card, 1992; and Card and Krueger, 1995).  (3) A variable closely related to fraction affected 
is “spike”, defined as the proportion of people earning one minimum wage (Dolado et al., 1996).   
Brown (1999, p. 2130) advocates that the “degree of impact” measures (e.g., fraction affected) 
are conceptually cleaner than the “relative minimum wage” variable (e.g., Kaitz index).  He also 
notes that fraction affected is “not well-suited for studying periods when the minimum wage is 
constant, and so its impact should be declining.  While there is more to be learned from a year in 
which the minimum wage increases by 10 or 15% more than average wages than from a year of 
modest decline, the periods between increases should together contain about as much information as 
the periods of increase.”  In other words, fraction is constant at zero regardless of how unimportant 
the minimum wage might become.  As discussed in Lemos (2003c), spike is superior to Kaitz index 
and fraction.  That is because, on the one hand spike is conceptually related to fraction and is 
therefore methodologically clean; on the other hand spike does not suffer from the same drawback, 
as it can be defined even when the minimum wage is constant.  Beyond statistical identification, an 
intuitive reason to use spike to measure the minimum wage impact on employment is that spike is a 
measure of those workers becoming more expensive; i.e., a measure of the extra employment costs.  
While spike was 4% for the US in 1993 (Dolado et al., 1996), it was 12% for Brazil, although as 
high as 25% in PE, a poor region.  Its correlation with the real minimum wage in the sample period 
is 0.64. 
Once regional variation has been ensured, no restriction needs to be placed on the time 
dummies.  The typical annual data model in the literature includes year and regional dummies to 
model time and regional fixed effects (Brown, 1999).  The monthly analogue of this model would 
require month in place of the year dummies.  However, that would eliminate all the variation in the 
model because each dummy would capture all that affects employment in each month - including the 
discrete minimum wage increases.  As a result, there would be no variation but noise left to identify 
the minimum wage effect (Burkhauser et al., 2000).  If on the one hand month dummies eliminate all 
the variation, on the other hand year dummies alone are not sufficient to model time in a month 
model.  An alternative is to include, in addition to year dummies, seasonal-month dummies to 
control for unobserved fixed effects across months, as in Burkhauser et al. (2000).  Also, 
stabilization plan dummies




4. DESCRIPTIVE MODELS  
Changes in employment can be decomposed into changes in hours of work and changes in the 
number of jobs.  If the first is positive and the second is negative, this could be an explanation of the 
non-negative (total) employment effects recently found in the literature.  Although this issue has not 
received much attention (Brown et al., 1982; Brown, 1999), more recent research (Michl, 2000; 
Zavodny, 2000; Card and Krueger, 2000; Neumark and Wascher, 2000) suggests that non-negative 
effects on jobs are sub-product of adjustments in hours.  Zavodny (2000) and Machin et al. (2003) 
estimate job and hours effects, but do not formalize it as a decomposition. 
                                                            
3 Each had very particular rules (Abreu, 1992); macro shocks were similar within, and different across plans.   
Additionally, a dummy was defined in October 1988, when the new Constitution:  shortened the working week from 48 
to 44 hours, and introduced an alternative working day of 6 consecutive hours. 
4 Wald and F tests were used to test whether spike had variation over and above the time dummies to explain 
employment.  Both tests rejected the restricted model.  This is reassuring that the variation captured by spike - further to 
that captured by the time dummies – is due to the minimum wage.  
  5 Let average hours in the population (T ) be equal to the product of average hours for those 
working (H ) and the employment rate ( ):  E
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where   and   are sample sizes of the employed and labour force and   is hours worked.    e N N hour
As noted by Brown et al. (1982, p. 497), “to measure the employment effect of the minimum 
wage, the ratio of employment to population is used most often as the dependent variable”.   
However, the above decomposition suggests not only  , but also  E T and  H as dependent variables; 
as a result, three specifications for the employment equation naturally arise.  If a log-log or semi-log 
functional form is assumed, and the set of regressors is the same, the additivity property of OLS 
holds and the estimate in the T model equals the sum of estimates in the H and   models.    E
Each of these three specifications was estimated for four alternative data filters: levels, first-
difference, twelfth difference, and both first and twelfth differences.  This is to account for Baker et 
al.’s (1999) criticism that negative or positive employment effects are found depending on whether 
short or long differencing is used.
 5  For each of these filters, the following base model is estimated: 
rt t r rt rt rt u f f lation realMW employment + + + + + = −1 inf log log γ β α , 
where   is taken in turn to mean  ,  rt employment E T or  H ;   and   are regional and time fixed 
effects (Section 3.2), as discussed in Section 3.2; and   is the error term.  Past inflation, 
, was explicitly included because on the one hand, the macroeconomic policy, including 
the minimum wage policy, was aimed at stabilizing the inflation; thus, inflation is driving other 
variables.  On the other hand, the minimum wage was used as indexer (Section 3.1); thus, past 
inflation captures the portion of the minimum wage increase that merely compensates for past 





1 − rt inf lation
The standard neoclassical model underlies the above empirical equation.  Assuming the 
production function depending on skilled and unskilled labour, with input and output prices W, MW, 
and p; maximization of profits at the (representative) firm level delivers the aggregate unconditional 
labour demand function L
d=L(p,W,MW).  As this is homogeneous of degree zero, all prices can be 
normalized by W, which is the reasoning for using Kaitz index in the literature (Card and Krueger, 
1995).  This is therefore the theoretical ground for modeling employment as a function of inflation 
and the Kaitz index.  Unfortunately, the Kaitz index does not ensure identification as discussed in 
Section 3.2.  Ultimately, the interest is on the bite of the minimum wage (and how it varies across 
regions).  To that end, spike is just as good as any other empirical variable (Dickens at al., 1999; 
Williams, 1993).  Moreover, if log wages are assumed normally distributed, no spillover effects are 
assumed, and the cut off point is known (the minimum wage); then spike summarizes all that there is 
to know about the employment effects of the minimum wage.   
If the labour supply is perfectly elastic, the effect of the minimum wage on employment can be 
estimated using estimates of labour demand curve alone.  If, however, labour supply is positively 
sloped, some sort of reduced form is what is being estimated, and supply shifters need to be 
included.  Here, these are mainly population and institutional variables that control for region 
                                                            
5 Card and Krueger (1995) found positive results using one and two-year-differencing whereas Neumark and Wascher 
(1992) found negative results using long differencing.  More technically, the aim is to reduce the variables to stationarity 
preventing spurious regression, which depends on the number of unit roots of the variables. 
  6 specific demographics potentially correlated with the minimum wage, the proportion of workers in 
the population who are:  young, younger than 10 years old, women, illiterates, retired, students, in 
the informal sector, in urban areas, in the public sector, in the building construction industry sector, 
in the metallurgic industry sector, basic education degree holders, high school degree holders, and 
the proportion of workers with a second job.
6  Thus, the model was estimated with and without 
controls.   
Dynamics, in the form of 24 lags of the dependent variable were also added because an increase 
in the minimum wage might not affect employment contemporaneously, but in future periods.  This 
is because the inability to adjust other inputs instantaneously creates lagged responses in 
employment (Brown, 1982; 992; Hamermesh, 1995).
7  
By modeling regional and time fixed effects, including controls and dynamics, and differencing 
the data, the errors are no longer expected to be serially correlated; few authors worry about that 
(Brown, 1999).
8  This variety of specifications embraces the typical ones in the literature (Brown, 
1999; Card and Krueger, 1995).
9 
Graph 2 plots log employment rate ( ) against log real minimum wage.  The suggested positive 
raw correlation in levels fades as the data is differenced; this offers no support for a negative effect 
of the minimum wage on employment - if anything, the correlation is weakly positive.  Nonetheless, 
such raw correlations need to be proved robust when the effect of other variables (demand and 
supply shocks) on employment is controlled for.  Graph 3 and Table 2 show estimates for the models 
discussed above.  In line with the plots, such estimates also give little support for a negative effect: 
they are mostly positive, statistically significant, and small.  The spike coefficient for the total 
employment model ranges from –0.036 to 0.779, decomposed into (a) the hours coefficient ranging 
from 0.193 to 0.844 (darker bars); and (b) the jobs coefficient ranging from -0.232 to 0.104 (lighter 
bars).  A 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage increases spike by 0.3 percentage points
10 and 
is associated with a decrease in total employment of less than 0.01%.  However, this is a correlation, 
once the model is purely descriptive; the next step is an attempt to estimate behavioural effects.    
E
 
                                                            
6 There is some agreement that demand side variables should be held constant, but less agreement on whether supply side 
variables should be included as controls and, if so, which ones.  The debate is about whether a reduced form or a demand 
equation is estimated, depending on whether the minimum wage is binding or not (Neumark and Wascher, 1992, 1995, 
1996).  For those who earn a minimum wage, employment is demand determined, but for those who earn more, relative 
supply and demand matter.  Typically, employment equations in the literature have been interpreted as demand 
equations, even though many include supply side variables (Card and Krueger, 1995).  Particularly debatable is the 
inclusion of a variable measuring enrolment rates in school (Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and Wascher, 1992).  As 
claimed by Brown (1999), if minimum wage reduces both employment and enrolment, reduced form and enrolment rate 
constant employment equations have very different interpretations.  In Brazil, a large number of minimum wage workers 
are adults no longer at school.  Also, schooling is largely available outside working hours, and therefore working and 
schooling need not be exclusive alternatives; if present, the simultaneity bias will not be as severe.  Due to these 
particularities and the unresolved debate, enrolment rate was not here included (Williams, 1993; Baker, 1999).  
7 Employment is reported to be AR(2) using annual data (Layard et al., 1991), which is equivalent to 24 lags on monthly 
data.  Results were robust to including 12 lags only, but that was thought to prematurely censor the adjustment process 
because lags beyond 12 were still significant. 
8 The results were robust when re-estimating the models using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation method. 
9 The models were White-corrected and sample size weighted, to correct for heteroskedasticity arising from the regional 
aggregation.  Incidentally, weighting captures the relative importance of each region to the average coefficient if the 
sample size is proportional to the regional labour market (Card and Krueger 1995; Neumark and Wascher 1992). 
10 This was obtained by regressing the difference of spike on the difference of the log of nominal minimum wage and 
controls associated to each empirical equation.  However, because the nominal minimum wage does not vary across 
regions (Section 3.2), the Kaitz index (using not only average wage, but also median wage, 25
th and 10
th percentile wage 
as the denominator) was used instead.  This estimate was fairly robust across all such specifications. 
  7 5. IDENTIFICATION  
To summarize the identification discussion:  (1) By using spike as a measure of the constant 
minimum wage, the effect of spike is not confounded with the effect of other regional macro 
variables on employment.  (2) By accounting for regional fixed effects, the effect of spike is not 
confounded with the effect of unobserved regional macro fixed effects on employment.  The last step 
is to control for simultaneity bias.  (3) By correcting for simultaneity bias, the effect of spike is not 
confounded with the effect of unobserved regional macro variables on employment.  
Even if the nominal minimum wage is assumed to be predetermined,
11 spike and employment 
are simultaneously determined.  Once the minimum wage is increased, the relative wage bargains 
determine the workers’ position in the wages distribution; this also determines who earns one 
minimum wage, i.e. who is at the spike.  An exogenous or predetermined variable - that affects 
employment only via spike - was necessary to ensure identification.  Lags of spike and political 
variables were proposed as such an instrumental variable. 
Under the assumption of serially uncorrelated errors, two instruments were defined.  Firstly, 
lags of spike - naturally correlated with spike but uncorrelated with the error term - fulfill the 
properties of a valid instrument.  Panel 1 of Table A (in the appendix) shows estimates, not always 
significant.  Other things constant, increasing the minimum wage by 10% (increases spike by 0.3 
percentage points) decreases employment by 0.1% at the most.  
Secondly, the Necessary Minimum Wage (SMN), as defined in the Constitution, i.e., the 
subsistence income for an adult worker and his/her family (Section 3), and its lags were used as 
instruments.  Such a bundle - whose cost varies across regions - has been unaffordable at the 
prevalent minimum wage.  This is not an observed, but a constructed variable, and because of that, it 
is not thought to be simultaneously determined with employment.  Because the SMN measures the 
hypothetical past inflation that would be experienced – but in reality is not – by minimum wage 
workers, it does not really play a role in wages and employment determination.  The correlation 
between the observed minimum wage and the SMN in differences is 0.53.  SMN is thought to be 
well correlated with the systematic part of the minimum wage but not correlated with the 
endogenous part of it.  Panel 2 of Table A (in the appendix) shows estimates, not always significant.  
Other things constant, increasing the minimum wage by 10% (increases spike by 0.3 percentage 
points) decreases employment by 0.32% at the most. 
 
5.1 SERIAL CORRELATION  
If the no serial correlation assumption is relaxed, the structure of the errors is crucial in defining 
which - if any - lag of the endogenous variable can be used as a valid instrument.  Assuming serial 
correlation due to mis-specified dependent variable dynamics, as its lags are included as regressors, 
serial correlation is expected to vanish.  Furthermore, the overidentifying restrictions (Sargan) test 
can be used as a model selection criteria, indicating which dynamics generate serially uncorrelated 
errors and validates lags (of the endogenous variable) as instruments (Andrews, 1999; Szroeter, 
2000).  Ultimately, an orthogonality condition must be made to produce an estimable equation and it 
                                                            
11 The nominal minimum wage might be endogenous if its increases are related to regional macroeconomic performance 
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Dolado et al., 1996; William and Mills, 1998).  Further endogeneity can be caused by the 
denominator of the real minimum wage, i.e. price or (average) wage deflators (Dolado et al, 1996; Zavodny, 2000).  The 
most obvious instruments for spike are lagged real minimum wage and lagged Kaitz index along with lagged spike.  
However, (a) they do not ensure identification, as discussed in Section 3.2; and (b) they suffer from the same drawback 
as spike when serial correlation is relaxed (Section 5.1).  Despite that, robustness checks using such instruments 
produced robust estimates.   
  8 is not too unrealistic to assume that serial correlation will vanish after differencing, adding 
dynamics, controls, regional and time dummies.  
This was the presumption in Section 5.  Panels 1 and 2 of Table B (in the appendix) show the 
associated Sargan test, Hausman test and F test (in the first step of the 2SLS) for the models in 
panels 1 and 2 of Table A.  The Hausman test shows endogeneity, as anticipated in Section 5; the F 
test shows the instruments performed well; but the Sargan test fails even the dynamic models - this 
invalidates lags of spike and SMN and its lags as instruments.  Only an excluded instrument with 
truly exogenous variation, uncorrelated with the error term and all its past lags, will ensure 
consistency.  Political variables were used in an attempt to define such an instrument. 
 
5.2 EXCLUDED EXOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
Three different sources of political variables were used as instruments.  Appendix 1 and Table 1 
give the institutional details underlying the validity of the instruments and their raw correlations. 
Politicians Data - It is well established in the politics of the minimum wage literature that 
politicians might favour or oppose minimum wage increases depending on the overall 
macroeconomic performance in each region.  Card and Krueger (1995, p. 134) argue, “Politicians 
from states in which an increase in the minimum wage is expected to have a strong effect on wages 
or employment opportunities might oppose the increase, whereas those from states in which the 
expected effect is smaller might support it.”  The final increase is the result of compromise between 
competing interest groups (regions) (Becker, 1983).  Sobel (1999) argues that interest group pressure 
significantly influenced congressional voting on the passage of the minimum wage bills in the US.  
In other words, the final increase is a regional weighted average; the impact of the increase in each 
region determines the political support (the relative weight) of that region to the increase.    
In Brazil, the Intersyndical Department of Parliamentary Consultancy (1) ranks the most 
influential congressmen according to political science criteria (debating, negotiating, voting, 
articulating, forming opinion, leading, etc.) rating their powers of persuasion; and (2) attributes 
marks to politicians voting in favour of workers in labour related bills.  These are measures of 
regional weight and were here used as instruments.  The more influential congressmen from a 
particular region, the more weight on the interests of that region; and the more pro-increase (contra-
increase) these influential congressmen, the higher (lower) the minimum wage.  First, the influential 
status is based on personal characteristics and there is no reason to believe they are endogenously 
determined with employment.  Second, the pro-increase (pro-worker) status is acquired by 
consistently voting in favour of workers in workers related bills.  Most of these bills are not directly 
related to employment, as for example: land reform, union leader tenure, president mandate length, 
etc. (see Appendix 1).  Those bills not directly related to employment were used to re-construct the 
pro-worker status; therefore, this measure is not endogenously determined with employment (see 
Appendix 1).  
Voting Data - Some might argue that voting data would measure the regional weight more 
directly associated with minimum wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1995) used voting data to 
construct a measure of political support.  Similar data, accounting for votes in favour and against a 
minimum wage bill, was collected for Brazil.  Usually, pressure against the bill results in inflation 
erosion of the real minimum wage (Sobel, 1999).  In Brazil, the centralized wage policy was 
intended to be deflationary via under-indexation of the real minimum wage (Section 3.1).  Opposing 
such a policy meant protecting the worker’s living standard.  Thus, the more congressmen against 
the increase, the more pressure for a bigger increase, and the higher the minimum wage (see 
Appendix 1). 
  9 Card and Krueger (1995, p. 135) used their political variable as a “proxy for otherwise 
unobservable factors in a state that might be related to the impact of the law”, implicitly assuming a 
direct effect on employment over and above the indirect effect via the minimum wage.  There is no 
reason to believe that at the time politicians are voting the bill this is having a simultaneous effect on 
employment in Brazil.  (1) The minimum wage is more a political issue in Brazil - with huge 
repercussions for political stability - than it is in the US.  The minimum wage is perceived as a 
source of political instability that affects the behaviour of voters and policymakers; it is, ultimately, a 
determinant of economic decisions (see Appendix 1).    (2) The minimum wage is more related to 
the wage-price spiral than to employment.  The wage-price spiral is a rapid phenomenon under high 
inflation.  Firms anticipate the spiral and do not adjust employment to avoid incurring in adjustment 
costs  (Section 3.1).  Those who regard the potential correlation between political variables and 
employment as a source of endogeneity should note the robustness of the results across instruments.  
This suggests that any endogeneity is negligible in both spike and instruments; in presence of severe 
endogeneity, there is no reason why all instruments would produce bias in the same direction and 
magnitude.  As an attempt to further measure the political bargaining process, data was collected on 
bills never submitted to voting, on the commissions formed to appreciate bills, and on the speeches 
of congressmen related to the bill (see Appendix 1).   
An interesting feature of voting data is that voting can be non-secret (nominal), secret, or party 
oriented.  During the dictatorship there was no voting, and when there was, it was symbolic - this is 
an exogenous instrument in itself.  Parties orient the vote prior to voting; non-secret votes (only on 
demand) are usually a strategy of those opposing the increase (favouring a bigger increase) to expose 
their opponents (see Appendix 1).  The lower the minimum wage, the more often non-secret votes 
are demanded.  Block (1980 and 1989) and Card and Krueger (1995) discuss party influence on the 
passage of minimum wage bills in the US.  Weighting the number and proportion of votes by the 
“voting dummy” generates an additional instrument.  This places more weight on the more reliable 
non-secret votes data, which also represents more proactive pro-increase and democratic times.   
Incidentally, this interaction dilutes the potential endogeneity discussed above, as it introduces 
exogenous variation from the voting dummy. 
Another way to measure the political bargaining process is to consider the frequency of 
increases.  An increase occurred whenever the socio-economic-political tension became unbearable 
(81/217 months).  The timing of the increases was regarded as a measure of tension and used to 
define a “voting cycle” variable.  The more often bills are presented, the lower the minimum wage 
(the faster its inflation erosion).  The voting cycle is assumed to be predetermined, as tension at each 
moment is a function of past information.  Weighting the voting data by the voting cycle generates 
an additional political variable that measures regional political support over time.  This places more 
weight on voting when it is most relevant (has just occurred).     
Election Data - As a further attempt to collect data with independent variation consider political 
propaganda.  Firstly, assume that incentives for more generous increases depend on the proximity of 
elections (Sobel, 1999). The basic assumption is that voters are myopic and opportunistic 
policymakers systematically manipulate macroeconomic policy right before elections to maximize 
their chances of re-election (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976).  Thus, the timing of elections was 
used to define an “election cycle” variable, as in political economy models (Carmignani, 2003).  The 
closer the elections, the higher the minimum wage.  The political cycle is an exogenous instrument, 
as it is determined by regular intervals of time.  Secondly, assume that left-wing politicians are in 
favour of more generous increases.  The lower the minimum wage, the more popular 
discontentment, and the more left-wing politicians elected (see Appendix 1).  Data on the number of 
(votes on) left wing politicians was used as an instrument.  The underlying assumption is that any 
  10endogeneity coming from the simultaneous determination of the number of left wing politicians 
elected and employment is negligible on monthly data because elections only happen every 4 years.  
However, incentive for increases are bigger the more left wing politicians elected and the closer the 
elections; weighting the election data by the election cycle generates an additional political variable 
varying over time and across regions.  Incidentally, this interaction dilutes any (already negligible) 
election data endogeneity, as it introduces exogenous variation from the election cycle.  Thirdly, 
assume that incentives for increases are bigger the lower the minimum wage.  Even if the proportion 
of left wing politicians is high and the next elections are close, not much political propaganda is 
made if the minimum wage is already at a relatively high level.  Moreover, this additional political 
variable re-introduces the real minimum wage variation into the model (Card and Krueger, 1995; 
Machin and Manning, 1994).   
The above instruments are strongly correlated with spike
12 (see Table 1) but not thought to be 
endogenously determined with employment.  Furthermore, the Sargan test did not fail the dynamic 
specifications in differences using such instruments (see Table B).  This is supportive of the 
assumption that any correlation with past information is not too strong. 
Some might argue that interactions “fake” the correlation with the endogenous variable and 
“create” a weak instrument; i.e. even if the instrument is uncorrelated with the endogenous variable 
in the population, correlation might not be zero in a finite sample (Nagar, 1959; Bound et al., 1995; 
Staiger and Stock, 1997).  There is nothing intrinsic about interactions that produce nonzero 
correlations.  In general, provided that there is some a priori economic reasoning in establishing the 
validity of the instruments (as exhaustively discussed in Appendix 1), and they pass the appropriate 
tests (see Table B), nothing particular about interactions invalidates instruments.  The issue is about 
weak instruments, not interactions per se (Angrist and Krueger, 1995; Krueger et al., 1999).  
Interactions were here justified for a conceptual reason.  Incidentally, they produce variation in both 
dimensions (over time and across regions) for instruments originally only varying in one dimension.  
In general, interactions did not produce stronger correlations; most of the above instruments are 
interaction-free, and yet correlated with spike (see bold in Table 1).  Interactions were motivated as 
further robustness checks and were by no means crucial in defining the instruments. 
These instruments were organized into four groups to account for potential criticisms on 
interaction, endogenous, and weak instrumenting contaminating the results:  (a) only interaction-free 
instruments; (b) a subsample from the interaction-free instruments whose correlation with spike was 
higher than 0.30; (c) voting data interacted with voting cycle; (d) election data interacted with 
election cycle and real minimum wage.  The full set of results is reported in Table A (in the 
appendix).  The estimates are still clustered around zero but larger than before in absolute terms, 
suggesting that some bias was corrected.  Estimates are both smaller and more significant when 
interaction-free instruments were used in panels 3 and 4; and larger, but not always significant, when 
interaction instruments were used in panels 5 and 6.  Table 3 presents the interval that brackets the 
effect of a 10% increase in the minimum wage across specifications: the total employment elasticity 
ranges from –0.13% to 0.11%, decomposed into (a) hours elasticity, ranging from -0.07% to 0.20%; 
and (b) jobs elasticity, ranging from -0.10% to 0.09%.  Holding other things constant, increasing the 
minimum wage by 10% (increases spike by 0.3 percentage points) decreases employment by 0.32% 
at the most.  At a regional level, increasing the minimum wage by 10% increases spike by 0.4 (0.1) 
percentage points in PE (SP), a poor (rich) region, and decreases employment by 0.43% (0.11%) in 
PE (SP) at the most.  In other words, it causes four times more disemployment in PE than it does in 
                                                            
12 It was intuitively easier to discuss the sign of the correlation in relation to the minimum wage even though the above 
are instruments for spike.  Both correlations should bear the same sign, because spike and minimum wage are positively 
correlated (see Section 3.1 and Appendix 1).    
  11SP.  Finally, the last two columns of Table A also show a less than 0.1% employment decrease in the 
long run.  
 The range of estimates produced is expected to embrace the true coefficient.  The preferred 
specification is the one in first differences, instrumented with interaction-free political variables - 
i.e., column 3, row 2, panel 4 of Table A.  This specification has the least serial correlation and use 
the less debatable set of political instruments.  It also performs better in the overall tests: the 
Hausman test suggests endogeneity, but the Sargan test did not fail, and the F test showed the high 
explanatory power of the instruments - which is reassuring of the validity of the instruments.  Thus, 
this specification is more reliable both conceptually and statistically; it is also more comparable with 
specifications in the existing literature, mostly in first differences.  Incidentally this “preferred” 
specification produces estimates fairly similar to the other specifications.   
Bracketing the employment elasticity below 0.32% across such a variety of models is 
reassuring; this number goes down to 0.01% in the preferred specification.  These results were 
remarkably robust to changes in the specification and to various alternative instruments.  They are 
also in line with the international and Brazilian literature.  Furthermore, the results are in line with 
prior expectations discussed in the Introduction and in Section 3.1.  Regarding the above as demand 
equations, the results are consistent with a fairly inelastic demand curve: minimum wage increases 
translate into small employment losses (Freeman, 1995).  Barros et al. (2002) also estimated a fairly 
inelastic labour demand curve for the industry sector in Brazil. 
 
7. CONCLUSION  
The international literature on minimum wage is scanty on non-US empirical evidence, in 
particular on developing countries evidence.  Using Brazilian data is an unbiased way of extending 
the understanding of minimum wage effects and assessing the robustness of findings for the US.  
This paper estimates the minimum wage effects on wages and employment using Brazilian 
household data for the 80’s and 90’s recently released for the public and not yet used for studies of 
the minimum wage.  Brazil’s minimum wage policy is a distinctive and central feature of the 
Brazilian economy.  Not only are increases in the minimum wage large and frequent, but also the 
minimum wage has been used as anti-inflation policy in addition to its social role.  It affects 
employment directly and indirectly, through wages, pensions, benefits, inflation, the informal sector, 
and the public deficit.  This confirms the importance of studying the minimum wage in Brazil. 
The international literature on minimum wage is scanty on non-US empirical evidence, in 
particular on developing countries evidence.  Using Brazilian data is an unbiased way of extending 
the understanding of minimum wage effects and assessing the robustness of findings for the US.  
This paper estimates the minimum wage effects on employment using Brazilian household data for 
the 80’s and 90’s recently released for public use and not yet used for studies of the minimum wage.  
Brazil’s minimum wage policy is a distinctive and central feature of the Brazilian economy.  Not 
only are increases in the minimum wage large and frequent, but also the minimum wage has been 
used as anti-inflation policy in addition to its social role.  It affects employment directly and 
indirectly, through wages, pensions, benefits, inflation, the informal sector, and the public deficit.   
Evidence of a moderately small adverse effect was uncovered.  An increase of 10% in the 
minimum wage was found to decrease employment by 0.32% at the most.  At a regional level, it was 
found to decrease employment by 0.43% (0.11%) at the most in PE (SP), a poor (rich) region, 
causing four times as much disemployment in PE than in SP.  This result was shown to be robust to 
many alternative specifications, estimation techniques, and instruments.  In presence of errors 
serially correlated, lagged endogenous variable was not a valid instrument.  A number of political 
  12variables were used instead as exogenous excluded instruments uncorrelated with the error term and 
all its past history.   
The above result is in line with the international and Brazilian empirical literature.  It is also 
consistent with a fairly inelastic demand curve where minimum wage increases translate into small 
employment losses.  To test further whether the minimum wage does not destroy too many jobs, this 
total effect was decomposed into hours and jobs effects.  This is because the non-negative effects on 
jobs have been suggested to be a sub-product of adjustments in hours in the recent debate in the 
literature.  Indeed, the total employment appears to be dominated by the hours rather than the jobs 
effects.  This suggests that the minimum wage does not hurt as much where it hurts the most: 
causing disemployment.   
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APPENDIX A – DEFINING EXCLUDED EXOGENEOUS INSTRUMENTS 
A.1 Politicians Data 
The intuition for the “degree of impact” variables discussed in Section 3.2 is that a national 
minimum wage increase affects a different proportion of people across regions depending on the 
overall macroeconomic performance in each region.  Similarly, the intuition for the political variable 
instrument is that the underlying political bargaining process for the increase implicitly accounts for 
the overall macroeconomic performance in each region.  Card and Krueger (1995, p. 134) argue, 
“Politicians from states in which an increase in the minimum wage is expected to have a strong 
effect on wages or employment opportunities might oppose the increase, whereas those from states 
in which the expected effect is smaller might support it.”  In Brazil, not only the direct, but also the 
indirect effect on employment via wages, pensions, benefits, inflation, informal sector, and the 
public deficit is on politicians’ minds.  The final increase is a regional weighted average.  Becker 
(1983) argues that policy is the result of compromise between competing interest groups (regions); 
what matters is their relative strength.  The impact of the increase in each region determines the 
political support (the relative weight) of that region to the increase.     
In Brazil, once an year, the Intersyndical Department of Parliamentary Consultancy (DIAP) 
ranks the 100 most influential congressmen in the country according to political science criteria 
(debating, negotiating, voting, articulating, forming opinion, leading, etc.) rating their powers of 
persuasion (DIAP, 2001).  These are personal characteristics and there is no reason to believe they 
are endogenously determined with employment.  The more such congressmen from a particular 
region, the more weight on the interests (group interests) of that region.  Sobel (1999) argues that 
interest group pressure significantly influenced congressional voting on the passage of the minimum 
wage bills in the US.  DIAP’s rank is then a measure of regional weight and was here defined as an 
instrument (IV1).  The more pro-increase (contra-increase) influential congressmen, the higher 
(lower) the minimum wage.  This can drive the correlation with real minimum wage to be either 
positive or negative, depending on the socio-economic-political context.  However, Table 1 shows a 
strong positive correlation (0.62), which suggests a fairly stable correlation over the sample period.  
  15DIAP’s rank was also re-defined as a proportion of congressmen from the sampled regions, which 
did not change the sign of the correlations (IV2). 
Once a year, DIAP also attributes marks to politicians for each vote favouring workers in 
workers related bills.  The pro-increase (pro-worker) status is acquired by consistently voting in 
favour of workers in labour related bills.  Most of these bills are not directly related to employment, 
as for example: land reform; union leader tenure; president mandate length; subsoil nationalization; 
unfair dismissal; wage, pension and benefits increases; petroleum state monopoly; work week 
shortening; 30 days minimum notice; centralized union; conditions of retirement; paid holidays; 
maternity leave; workers representative to company management; progressive tax bands; central 
bank independence; direct presidential elections; striking rights; civil servants tenure; political 
administrative reform; voluntary union contribution; president re-election; redundancy and 
dismissals legal process subject to union check; high education tuition free; public health insurance, 
etc.
13  A number of these are clearly not endogenously determined with employment; this should 
dilute the endogeneity of those which are.  The pro-worker status was re-defined using solely those 
bills not simultaneously determined with employment but was not sensitive to that, suggesting that a 
considerable part of the variation is exogenous.  The average mark for each region is a measure of 
how pro-workers (pro-increase) that region is (IV3); the higher the mark, the higher the minimum 
wage.  Table 1 confirms a strong positive correlation with the real minimum wage  (0.38), but not 
with spike.  Dummies were also defined for whether these politicians are left or right wing, whether 
or not they hold a degree, and the number of mandates they hold (IV4 to IV6), which were then 
interacted (IV7).   
A.2 Voting Data 
Some might argue that voting data would measure the regional weight more directly associated 
with minimum wage increases.  Card and Krueger (1995) used voting data to construct a measure of 
political support.  Similar data was collected for Brazil from the National Congress Daily (Diario do 
Congresso Nacional, DCN).  The number of congressmen votes in favour (IV8 and IV9), against 
(IV10 and IV11) and absent (IV12 and IV13) in each minimum wage bill during the sample period 
were collected in both the Federal Senate and the Deputy Chamber.  Usually, pressure against the 
bill (pressure for no increase or a smaller increase) results in inflation erosion of the real minimum 
wage (Sobel, 1999).  In Brazil, there are two distinct reasons to oppose the increase.  In line with the 
above, pressure against the increase means that the increase cannot be afforded; this argument is 
usually related to the inflation impact or public deficit impact of the increase (Section 3.1).  In 
contrast, pressure against the increase means that the increase is not large enough to even maintain 
the minimum wage purchase power; this argument is usually related to protecting the worker’s 
standard of living.  Examples of both arguments can be found in the newspapers: 
“The Government makes the minimum wage increase conditional upon the inflation level, the benefits and pension 
bill, the Estates and Cities finances…  Most Congressmen know that a big increase would put at risk the economic 
stability of the country.” (Estadao, 15
th January 1998). 
“The minimum wage increase affected inflation… but the time is long gone when the increase would spread 
through the whole Economy, like the petrol increase” (Estadao, 13
th May, 2000). 
“…congressmen are worried about finding the resources to afford the bill at the federal level, but have forgotten the 
municipal level… increasing the minimum wage to R$200 would increase the wage bill of most small and medium 
towns of the Northeast by 7.8%, where 60% to 70% of civil servants receive one minimum wage… if they do not 
find resources at a municipal level, mayors will have to fire civil servants” (Estadao, 11
th December, 2001). 
                                                            
13 For a full list, see DIAP (1986, 1990, 1994, 2002).  These publications are not part of a series; they have slightly 
different methodologies that required some adjustment.  But the main idea is the same – grading politicians on how 
worker sympathetic they are. 
  16“…to buy the same basket as in 1940, when it was introduced, the minimum wage would have to be R$517.55 [as 
opposed to the current R$130]” (Estadao, 10
th May, 1998). 
The underlying reason for being against the increase will depend on the political and economic 
context, party affiliation and workers’ bargaining power, which naturally vary over time.  As 
discussed in Section 3.1, the centralized wage policy was designed to control inflation and the public 
deficit via under-indexation or the real minimum wage; Graph 1 shows supporting evidence of the 
resulting steady decrease.  It is hard to think that being against these increases is being in favour of 
even smaller increases; it is more plausible to think that opposing such a policy meant favouring 
protection of the worker’s living standard.  Thus, the more congressmen against the increase, the 
more pressure for a bigger increase, and the higher the minimum wage.  Absence (not justifiable 
absence through sickness, official mission, etc.) is also important because it might be a strategy 
against the passage of the bill (see newspaper citations below).  Table 1 shows strong negative 
correlations, although a positive sign was expected for IV10 and IV11.  This is either because of the 
underlying reason for opposing the increase, which can effectively drive the correlation to be 
negative or positive; or because of the definition of the instrument as “number” rather than 
“proportion”.  The number of congressmen both in favour and against the increase can move in the 
same direction as the minimum wage, but the proportions are not expected to.  Thus, proportions 
were defined (IV14 to IV17), but although the correlation is stronger (ranging from 0.19 to 0.60), the 
sign did not change.  Although IV15 and IV16 bare a negative sign, the correlations are robust 
across definitions and variables - they cannot have happened by chance alone.  Most importantly, 
there is plausible economic reasoning for either a positive or a negative correlation.  Provided the 
correlation is reliable - nonzero and stable over time - it suffices to establish a robust correlation.   
Card and Krueger (1995, p. 135) used their political variable as a “proxy for otherwise 
unobservable factors in a state that might be related to the impact of the law”, implicitly assuming a 
direct effect on employment over and above the indirect effect via the minimum wage.  There is no 
reason to believe that at the time politicians are voting the bill this is having a simultaneous effect on 
employment in Brazil.  (1) The minimum wage is more a political issue in Brazil - with huge 
repercussions for political stability - than it is in the US.  The minimum wage is perceived as a 
source of political instability that affects the behaviour of voters and policymakers; it is, ultimately, a 
determinant of economic decisions (see Appendix 1).    (2) The minimum wage is more related to 
the wage-price spiral than to employment.  The wage-price spiral is a rapid phenomenon under high 
inflation, when firms are more able to adjust their prices.  They anticipate the wage-price spiral and 
do not adjust employment to avoid incurring in adjustment costs  (Section 3.1).  Those who regard 
the potential correlation between political variables and employment as a source of endogeneity 
should note the robustness of the results across instruments.  This suggests that any endogeneity is 
negligible in both spike and instruments; in presence of severe endogeneity, there is no reason why 
all instruments would produce bias in the same direction and magnitude.   
An interesting feature of voting data is that voting can be non-secret (nominal), secret, or party 
oriented.  During the dictatorship there was no voting, and when there was, it was symbolic - this is 
an exogenous instrument in itself.  Parties orient the vote prior to voting; non-secret votes (only on 
demand) are usually a strategy of those opposing the increase (favouring a bigger increase) to expose 
their opponents.  For example: 
“The popular movement against the minimum wage of R$151 toughens up in Brasilia on Easter, when a circus tent 
will be installed in front of the Congress to shelter 1,000 retired workers who will camp there until voting on the 
bill on the 26
th.  The vigil will include a mass for the “conversion” of deputies and senators in favour of a more 
generous minimum wage…  The organizers of the movement [the Labour Party] want to install panels with the 
names of the Congressmen and their intentions of votes in Rio and Sao Paulo… as well as large screens for the 
people to watch the voting live” (Estadao, 19
th April, 2000). 
  17“In a convoluted session stretching until early morning, the Government got the Congress to approve the R$151 
minimum wage… after 3 months of fighting and thanks to a full day of intense lobbying.  The session, due to start 
at 7pm, was postponed to 8pm, to prevent voting going live on television, exposing the ‘situation’ Congressmen 
[those in favour of the R$151 Government proposal] …who did not succeed in making a deal for symbolic voting, 
which guarantees the anonymity of votes.  The opposition Congressmen… insisted on nominal voting”. (Estadao, 
11
th May 2000).  “By determination of the president… the general secretary will list the names of the Congressmen 
who will be punished for voting against the Government.” (Estadao, 12
th May 2000).   
“The increasing tension between allies and adversaries of the Government because of the difficulties in finding a 
solution to the minimum wage increase might stop the voting… the leader of the Labour Party… announced 
yesterday that his party will be absent”  (Estadao, 9
th November, 2000). 
The lower the minimum wage, the more pressure for a bigger increase, and the more often non-
secret votes are demanded.  Thus, a dummy (3 for non-secret, 2 for party oriented and 1 for 
secret/symbolic vote) was defined for the Federal Senate and Deputy Chamber (IV18 and IV19) to 
account for data reliability, pressure strategies, and democracy level.  Table 1 shows strong 
correlations (0.49 and 0.59) and the expected negative sign.  Block (1980 and 1989) and Card and 
Krueger (1995) discuss party influence on the passage of minimum wage bills in the US.  Weighting 
the number and proportion of votes by the “voting dummy” is a natural step (IV20 to IV29).  This 
places more weight on the more reliable non-secret votes data, which also represents more proactive 
pro-increase and democratic times.  Table 1 shows strong negative correlations.  Incidentally, this 
interaction dilutes the potential endogeneity discussed above, as it introduces exogenous variation 
from the voting dummy. 
Another way to measure the political bargaining process is to consider the frequency of 
increases.  An increase occurred whenever the socio-economic-political tension became unbearable 
(81/217 months); tension in the month immediately after the increase is low, reaching its peak the 
month before the next increase.  The timing of the increases was regarded as a measure of tension 
and used to define a “voting cycle” variable (IV30).
14  The more often bills are presented, the lower 
the minimum wage (the faster its inflation erosion).  Table 1 shows a strong correlation (0.29) and 
the expected positive sign.  The voting cycle is assumed to be predetermined, as tension at each 
moment is a function of past information.  
Weighting the voting data by the voting cycle generates a political variable that measures 
regional political support over time (IV35 to IV50).  This places more weight on voting when it is 
most relevant (has just occurred), and less weight when the tension is such that new voting is 
imminent.  Weighting is also expected to improve the instruments performance - it produces 
variation across regions and over time - although Table 1 shows the correlations to be again strong 
and negative, but not stronger.       
As an attempt to further measure the political bargaining process, data was collected on bills 
never submitted to voting, on the commissions formed to appreciate bills, and on the speeches of 
congressmen related to the bill.  Data on bills submitted by congressmen from the sampled regions 
to the Federal Senate and the Deputy Chamber was collected:  the number of minimum wage bills 
presented (IV51), by left-wing
15 congressmen (IV52), and the number of minimum wage increase 
bills (IV53).  The more bills presented, the lower the minimum wage.  Table 1 shows strong negative 
correlations, as expected.  For the same reasons as before, the last two instruments were defined as 
proportions of the first one (IV54 and IV55), which again did not change the sign of the correlation.  
Also, a dummy was defined for whether the bill was effective (never voted) (IV56).  The more 
                                                            
14 Tension can only be measured when it reaches its peak triggering an increase.  Assuming that tension grows linearly, 
the voting cycle was defined as a linear time trend between each of the two increases.  Other functional forms 
(exponential, squared, squared root and log) were also experimented (IV31 to IV34).  
15 Left wing designation according to Figueiredo and Linomgi (1995). 
  18effective the bills, the higher (less inflation eroded) the minimum wage.  Table 1 confirms the 
expected positive correlation.  Two more variables were defined to measure the length of the passage 
of the bill: sum of days (if more than one bill per month) (IV57); and average days (IV58).  The 
longer the passage, the more pressure (the less bargaining power), the higher (lower) the minimum 
wage.  The correlation sign will depend on the underlying reason for the delay, but it should be the 
same for both spike and real minimum wage.  Table 1 shows that the signs differ.  This is either 
because of no genuine correlation (correlations are indeed low) or because of measurement error.  
Regarding the latter, this data was collected from the National Congress System Information 
(SICON) web page, and (a subsample) checked against data from the Section for Parliamentary 
Information (SEDOP).  The data is assumed to be reliable and measurement error negligible (IV51 
to IV53 show strong correlations).  Also, the number of bills was weighted by the “effectiveness” 
(IV59) and “length” dummies (IV60 and IV61). 
Data was also collected on the number of speeches by congressmen from the sampled regions in 
both the Federal Senate and the Deputy Chamber regarding the minimum wage (IV62), by left-wing 
congressmen (IV63), regarding a minimum wage increase (IV64), in favour (IV65) and against the 
increase (IV66).  The more speeches needed, the lower the minimum wage.  Table 1 confirms the 
expected negative correlations.  This data was collected from the Shorthand Notes from the National 
Congress Sessions (and associated DCN); it is assumed to be reliable and the measurement error 
negligible for the first three, but not for the last two instruments.  This is because the last two are 
subject to interpretation, aggravated by the complex socio-economic-political Brazilian context and 
by the number of variables affected by the minimum wage.  Once more the last four instruments 
were defined as proportions of the first (IV67-IV70), and once more the sign of the correlation 
remained unchanged. 
For most of the bills submitted, a commission would appreciate the impact of the increase prior 
to voting.  Data on the (total, left and right-wing) number of congressmen from the sampled regions 
in each commission was collected (IV71 to IV73).  The more congressmen in favour of the increase, 
the lower the minimum wage, as before.  Table 1 shows negative correlations, even though a 
positive sign was expected for IV73, as before.  Once more, proportions were defined (IV74 to 
IV77), which did not change the sign of the correlations with real minimum wage, but turned into 
positive the correlations with spike.  As before, this is either because of no genuine correlation 
(correlations are indeed low) or because of measurement error.  Regarding the latter, this data was 
collected from the SICON, and checked against the SEDOP, as before, and is assumed to be reliable.  
However, measurement error is not assumed to be negligible, because of the nature of the data (there 
was not always a commission, not always a minimum wage one, etc.).  Even though these 
instruments were thought to capture the true underlying political bargaining process, not much 
confidence should be placed in them.   
A.3 Election Data 
However, regional affordability is not the only criteria for political support.  As an attempt to 
collect data with independent variation to further test the robustness of the estimates, consider 
political propaganda:   
“…around 500 mayors will meet in Brasilia to discuss a strategy to pressure the Congress against … the minimum 
wage increase... [they] changed their strategy of pressure... mainly due to the proximity of the election campaign 
for the re-election of the congressmen, who dispute the support of the mayors in their electoral basis.” (Estadao, 
11
th December 2001). 
“Usually, the minimum wage increase is defined… in December, but this year the elections anticipated the 
debate…  the Government strategy is to postpone the increase above inflation until after October, when the new 
president will have been elected.” (Estadao, 10
th July 2002). 
  19Firstly, assume that incentives for more generous increases depend on the proximity of 
elections.  Sobel (1999, p. 766) specified a model that “shows an incentive for Congress to time 
changes in the minimum wage just before elections”.  He argues that this was the case over the entire 
history of the minimum wage, starting with the Fair Labor Standards Act going into effect just eight 
days before election.  Similarly, in Brazil, the Consolidacao das Leis do Trabalho introduced the 
minimum wage - on the 1
st May 1943 - as a prelude to amending the Constitution to introduce 
presidential elections.  In every single electoral year in the sample period there was a minimum wage 
increase - mostly either in the same month, or a couple of months before the election.  This is 
reassuring evidence that the minimum wage is used as political propaganda.  The basic assumption is 
that voters are myopic and opportunistic policymakers systematically manipulate macroeconomic 
policy right before elections to maximize their chances of re-election (Nordhaus, 1975; Lindbeck, 
1976).  Thus, the timing of elections was used to define an “election cycle” variable (IV78 for 
national, and IV79 for municipal elections)
16, as in to political economy models (Carmignani, 2003).  
The closer the elections, the higher the minimum wage.  Table 1 confirms the expected negative 
correlations (0.34 and 0.04).  The political cycle is assumed to be exogenous, as it is determined by 
regular intervals of time. 
Secondly, assume that left-wing politicians are in favour of more generous increases.  The lower 
the minimum wage, the more popular discontentment, and the more left-wing politicians elected.  
Data was collected (Nicolau, 1998) on the number (proportion) of left-wing candidates elected as 
president, federal deputy, governor, estate deputy, senator, and capital mayor (IV88 to IV99).   
Although not included in their final version, Baker et al. (1999) used a dummy for whether left wing 
politicians were in power as an instrument, a common procedure in political economy models 
(Carmignani, 2003).  Similarly, data was collected on the number (proportion) of votes for left-wing 
candidates (IV100 to IV107).  Table 1 shows strong negative correlations (0.11 to 0.69), as expected, 
stronger for proportions.  The underlying assumption is that any endogeneity coming from the 
simultaneous determination of the number of (votes on) left wing politicians and employment is 
negligible on monthly data because elections only happen every 4 years.  However, incentive for 
increases are bigger the more left wing politicians elected and the closer the elections; weighting the 
election data by the election cycle (IV108 to IV127) is expected to improve the instruments 
performance - it produces variation across regions and over time – although Table 1 shows 
correlations negative and strong, but not stronger.  Incidentally, this interaction dilutes any (already 
negligible) potential endogeneity discussed above, as it introduces exogenous variation from the 
election cycle.   
Thirdly, assume that incentives for increases are bigger the lower the minimum wage.  Even if 
the proportion of left wing politicians is high and the next elections are close, not much political 
propaganda is made if the minimum wage is already at a relatively high level.  Moreover, this re-
introduces the real minimum wage variation into the model (Card and Krueger, 1995; Machin and 
Manning, 1994).  Incidentally, Table 1 shows that this improves the correlations (IV128 to IV147). 
The above instruments are strongly correlated with spike (see Table 1) but not thought to be 
endogenously determined with employment.  Furthermore, the Sargan test - here regarded as a serial 
correlation test - did not fail the dynamic specifications in differences using such instruments (see 
Table B).  This is supportive of the assumption that any correlation with past information is not too 
strong. 
 
                                                            
16 Like the voting cycle, the political cycle is a linear (exponential, squared, squared root and log) time trend between 
two consecutive elections (IV80 to IV87). 
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BRAZIL from 1982 to 2000
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hours and job effects
ph 3 - EFFECT OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYME
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Table 1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE, SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continues
IV spike real MW instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
I - POLITICIANS DATA
IV1 0.21 0.62 nb (out of 100) of most influential politicians in the country the more influential the congressmen and the more pro-increase, the higher the mw
IV2 0.28 0.16 IV2 as a proportion of total influential politicians in the sampled regions as above
IV3 0.01 0.38 measure of how worker-sympathetic congressmen are the higher the mark, the more pro-increase, the higher the mw
IV4 -0.56 -0.51 dummy: 1 if left wing, 0 otherwise for congressmen in IV3 (average) the more left wing, the higher the mw
IV5 0.16 0.04 dummy: 1 if university graduated, 0 otherwise for congressman in IV3 (average) the more education, the bigger the support for a higher mw
IV6 -0.25 -0.54 nb of mandates for congressman in IV3 (average) the longer in power, the less favourable of a higher mw
IV7 -0.42 -0.35 IV3*IV4*IV5*IV6
II - VOTING DATA
IV8 -0.44 -0.59 nb of senator votes in favour of the mw increase the more congressmen in favour of the increase (as opposed to a bigger increase), the lower the mw
IV9 -0.56 -0.48 nb of deputy votes in favour of the mw increase as above
IV10 -0.20 -0.17 nb of senator votes against the mw increase the more congressmen against the increase (as opposed to an increase), the lower the mw
IV11 -0.50 -0.49 nb of deputy votes against the mw increase as above
IV12 -0.07 -0.05 nb of senators absent when the mw increase was voted the more congressmen absent (the less pressure for a bigger increase), the lower the mw
IV13 -0.13 -0.35 nb of deputys absent when the mw increase was voted as above
IV14 -0.51 -0.60 IV8 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV15 -0.42 -0.36 IV9 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV16 -0.20 -0.20 IV10 as a proportion of total senator votes as above
IV17 -0.47 -0.60 IV11 as a proportion of total deputy votes as above
IV18 -0.47 -0.49 dummy for senator vote: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 party oriented vote  the more non-secret votes, the lower the mw (non-secret votes expose those against it)
IV19 -0.59 -0.60 dummy for deputy vote: 3 non-secret, 1 secret, and 2 party oriented vote  as above
IV20 -0.38 -0.49 IV8*IV18
IV21 -0.54 -0.47 IV9*IV19
IV22 -0.19 -0.15 IV10*IV18
IV23 -0.49 -0.49 IV11*IV19
IV24 -0.07 -0.05 IV12*IV18
IV25 -0.12 -0.34 IV13*IV19
IV26 -0.44 -0.49 IV14*IV18
IV27 -0.20 -0.17 IV15*IV19
IV28 -0.44 -0.34 IV16*IV18
IV29 -0.46 -0.57 IV17*IV19
IV30 0.36 0.29 voting cycle (linear) the more often mw bills are voted, the higher the mw
IV31 0.37 0.27 voting cycle (squared root) as above
IV32 0.08 0.02 voting cycle (squared) as above
IV33 0.34 0.22 voting cycle (log) as above
IV34 0.08 0.02 voting cycle (exponential) as above
IV35 -0.25 -0.42 IV8*IV30
IV36 -0.40 -0.43 IV9*IV30
IV37 -0.17 -0.14 IV10*IV30
IV38 -0.31 -0.36 IV11*IV30
IV39 -0.30 -0.44 IV14*IV30
IV40 -0.34 -0.42 IV15*IV30
IV41 -0.18 -0.17 IV16*IV30
IV42 -0.28 -0.42 IV17*IV30
IV43 -0.29 -0.45 IV20*IV30
IV44 -0.40 -0.43 IV21*IV30
IV45 -0.15 -0.11 IV22*IV30
IV46 -0.31 -0.36 IV23*IV30
IV47 -0.34 -0.47 IV26*IV30
IV48 -0.33 -0.40 IV27*IV30
IV49 -0.16 -0.15 IV28*IV30
IV50 -0.28 -0.41 IV29*IV30
  
  2 
Table 1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE, SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continues
IV spike real MW instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
IV51 -0.30 -0.34 nb of mw bills by congressman from the sampled regions the more mw bills, the lower is the mw 
IV52 -0.11 -0.05 nb of mw bills by left wing congressman from the sampled regions as above
IV53 -0.31 -0.38 nb of mw increase bills by congressman from the sampled regions as above
IV54 -0.07 -0.02 IV52 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV55 -0.29 -0.44 IV53 as a proportion of IV51 as above
IV56 0.06 0.14 dummy: 0 if bill not effective and 1 if effective (average)  the more effective the bills, the (less eroded) higher the mw
IV57 -0.06 0.04 nb days mw bills took to be appreciated (sum) the longer to be appreciated, (the more pressure or the less bargaining power) the higher/lower the mw
IV58 0.00 0.11 nb days mw bills took to be appreciated (average) as above
IV59 -0.32 -0.39 IV51*IV56
IV60 -0.11 -0.08 IV51*IV57
IV61 -0.08 0.00 IV51*IV58
IV62 -0.15 -0.14 nb of congressman speechs regarding the mw  the more the need for speechs, the lower is the mw 
IV63 -0.14 -0.14 nb of left wing congressman speechs regarding the mw  as above
IV64 -0.14 -0.15 nb of congressman speechs regarding a mw increase as above
IV65 -0.14 -0.12 nb of congressman speechs favourable to a mw increase as above
IV66 -0.10 -0.09 nb of congressman speechs against a mw increase as above
IV67 -0.16 -0.16 IV62 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV68 -0.17 -0.18 IV63 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV69 -0.13 -0.13 IV64 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV70 -0.08 -0.06 IV65 as a proportion of speechs from the sampled regions as above
IV71 -0.19 -0.23 nb of congressman in the mw comission  the more (the need of) congressmen in the comission, the lower the mw 
IV72 -0.25 -0.19 nb of left wing congressman in the mw comission  as above
IV73 -0.12 -0.22 nb of right wing congressman in the mw comission  as above
IV74 -0.20 -0.30 IV71 as a proportion of comission congressmen  as above
IV75 0.10 -0.16 IV71 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
IV76 0.04 -0.08 IV72 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
IV77 0.10 -0.16 IV73 as a proportion of comission congressmen from the sampled regions as above
III - ELECTIONS DATA
IV78 -0.27 -0.35 national election cycle (linear) the closer the elections, the lower the mw increase
IV79 -0.03 -0.05 municipal election cycle (linear) as above
IV80 -0.22 -0.30 national election cycle (squared root) as above
IV81 -0.04 -0.02 municipal election cycle (squared root) as above
IV82 -0.31 -0.39 national election cycle (squared) as above
IV83 -0.20 -0.22 municipal election cycle (squared) as above
IV84 -0.15 -0.22 national election cycle (log) as above
IV85 -0.05 -0.01 municipal election cycle (log) as above
IV86 -0.03 -0.03 national election cycle (exponential) as above
IV87 -0.05 -0.08 municipal election cycle (exponential) as above
IV88 -0.38 -0.54 nb of left wing candidates to president elected the lower the mw, the more left wing congressmen elected 
IV89 -0.64 -0.34 nb of left wing candidates to federal deputy elected as above
IV90 -0.34 -0.19 nb of left wing candidates to senator elected as above
IV91 -0.23 -0.25 nb of left wing candidates to governor elected as above
IV92 -0.49 -0.28 nb of left wing candidates to state deputy elected as above
IV93 -0.02 -0.07 nb of left wing candidates to capital mayor elected as above
IV94 -0.38 -0.54 proportion of left wing candidates to president elected the lower the mw, the more left wing congressmen elected 
IV95 -0.60 -0.48 proportion of left wing candidates to federal deputy elected as above
IV96 -0.45 -0.46 proportion of left wing candidates to senator elected as above
IV97 -0.28 -0.28 proportion of left wing candidates to governor elected as above
IV98 -0.60 -0.48 proportion of left wing candidates to state deputy elected as above
IV99 -0.02 -0.07 proportion of left wing candidates to capital mayor elected as aboveTable 1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MINIMUM WAGE, SPIKE AND POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS - continued
IV spike real MW instrument (vary across regions and over time) intuition
IV100 -0.26 -0.25 nb of votes in left wing president candidates as above
IV101 -0.16 -0.11 nb of votes in left wing federal deputy candidates as above
IV102 -0.30 -0.12 nb of votes in left wing governor candidates as above
IV103 -0.15 -0.06 nb of votes in left wing estate deputy candidates as above
IV104 -0.54 -0.69 proportion of votes in left wing president candidates as above
IV105 -0.63 -0.49 proportion of votes in left wing federal deputy candidates as above
IV106 -0.39 -0.30 proportion of votes in left wing governor candidates as above
IV107 -0.61 -0.49 proportion of votes in left wing estate deputy candidates as above
IV108 -0.33 -0.46 IV78*IV98
IV109 -0.49 -0.37 IV79*IV98
IV110 -0.35 -0.23 IV80*IV98
IV111 -0.25 -0.29 IV81*IV98
IV112 -0.39 -0.34 IV82*IV94
IV113 -0.03 -0.11 IV83*IV99
IV114 -0.33 -0.46 IV84*IV98
IV115 -0.46 -0.45 IV85*IV98
IV116 -0.39 -0.48 IV86*IV98
IV117 -0.31 -0.31 IV87*IV98
IV118 -0.45 -0.46 IV88*IV98
IV119 -0.03 -0.11 IV89*IV99
IV120 -0.23 -0.26 IV90*IV98
IV121 -0.20 -0.08 IV91*IV98
IV122 -0.30 -0.19 IV92*IV98
IV123 -0.20 -0.09 IV93*IV98
IV124 -0.43 -0.55 IV94*IV98
IV125 -0.45 -0.46 IV95*IV98
IV126 -0.35 -0.34 IV96*IV98
IV127 -0.44 -0.46 IV97*IV98
IV128 -0.33 -0.45 IV108*rmw
IV129 -0.46 -0.22 IV109*rmw
IV130 -0.32 -0.16 IV110*rmw
IV131 -0.21 -0.22 IV111*rmw
IV132 -0.33 -0.16 IV112*rmw
IV133 -0.03 -0.24 IV113*rmw
IV134 -0.33 -0.45 IV114*rmw
IV135 -0.42 -0.30 IV115*rmw
IV136 -0.38 -0.39 IV116*rmw
IV137 -0.27 -0.24 IV117*rmw
IV138 -0.41 -0.30 IV118*rmw
IV139 -0.03 -0.24 IV119*rmw
IV140 -0.23 -0.24 IV120*rmw
IV141 -0.17 -0.06 IV121*rmw
IV142 -0.29 -0.13 IV122*rmw
IV143 -0.16 -0.05 IV123*rmw
IV144 -0.42 -0.50 IV124*rmw
IV145 -0.41 -0.29 IV125*rmw
IV146 -0.32 -0.24 IV126*rmw
IV147 -0.40 -0.29 IV127*rmw
source:  IV1-IV44 National Congress; IV45-IV49 DIAP
1) instruments in bold are prior to interaction
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Table 2 - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENT OF SPIKE
fixed effects controls dynamics long run
dependent data filter coef se coef se coef se coef
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 - uninstrumented
total employment (1) levels -0.022 0.095 -0.036 0.099 0.203 0.090 0.108
hours worked 0.210 0.080 0.193 0.084 0.200 0.080 0.109
employment rate -0.232 0.042 -0.230 0.043 -0.024 0.025 -0.013
total employment (2) first 0.625 0.111 0.663 0.111 0.441 0.098 -0.117
hours worked difference 0.704 0.110 0.737 0.109 0.422 0.090 -0.051
employment rate -0.079 0.034 -0.074 0.027 -0.013 0.030 0.016
total employment (3) twelfth 0.570 0.102 0.551 0.103 0.347 0.083 0.250
hours worked difference 0.466 0.095 0.454 0.096 0.328 0.074 0.326
employment rate 0.104 0.044 0.097 0.043 -0.012 0.031 -0.008
total employment (4) first and 0.747 0.117 0.779 0.116 0.317 0.079 -0.084
hours worked twelfth 0.823 0.116 0.844 0.115 0.317 0.071 -0.059
employment rate difference -0.076 0.032 -0.065 0.030 -0.031 0.027 0.024
1) The dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate.  
    Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic model.
2) Column 1 shows the base specification with region and time fixed (and past inflation); column 2 adds controls to the base specification;  
     and column 3 adds controls and dynamics (24 lags of the independent variable).  Column 4 shows the long run coefficient associated
      to the model in column 3.  Each comun shows Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break 
      dummies.  Controls are population and institutional factors.
3) Spike is endogeneous.  Panel 1 shows uninstrumented, and panels 2 to 6 show instrumented estimates using lags of spike and political 
      variables as instruments.  Each panel has four rows:  (1) within groups (levels),  (2) first differences, (3) twefth  differences, and (4) first
     and twelfth differences.
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Table 3 - EFFECT OF A 10% INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE ON EMPLOYMENT 
dependent data filter interval
variable lower upper
total employment (1) levels -0.13 0.29
hours worked -0.05 0.29
employment rate -0.16 0.02
total employment (2) first -0.32 0.20
hours worked difference -0.17 0.23
employment rate -0.21 0.02
total employment (3) twelfth -0.10 0.23
hours worked difference -0.05 0.15
employment rate -0.07 0.22
total employment (4) first and -0.23 0.29
hours worked twelfth -0.18 0.49
employment rate difference -0.25 0.06
1) For full estimates see Table 1 and Table A in the Appendix.  Because a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage increases  
    spike by 0.3 percentage points, all estimates were multiplied by 0.3 (see Section 4).
2) A 10% increase in the minimum wage decreases employment by less than 1% (lower end) across models.
3) The dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and 
    employment rate.  Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic model.
4) Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.  Controls are population








  5 Table A - ESTIMATES OF THE COEFFICIENT OF SPIKE
fixed effects controls dynamics long run fixed effects controls dynamics long run
dependent data filter coef se coef se coef se coef coef se coef se coef se coef
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 - IV: lagged spike 4 - IV: interaction-free whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.30
total employment (1) levels -0.327 0.137 -0.327 0.139 0.042 0.126 0.023 -0.255 0.209 -0.237 0.206 0.365 0.165 0.190
hours worked -0.023 0.121 -0.021 0.122 0.060 0.112 0.033 0.268 0.162 0.282 0.167 0.191 0.141 0.104
employment rate -0.304 0.056 -0.306 0.056 -0.011 0.035 -0.006 -0.523 0.106 -0.519 0.103 0.057 0.061 0.030
total employment (2) first 0.675 0.195 0.628 0.185 0.527 0.187 -0.140 0.035 0.505 0.288 0.493 -0.050 0.450 0.013
hours worked difference 0.774 0.191 0.738 0.181 0.513 0.166 -0.062 0.208 0.473 0.439 0.469 0.167 0.410 -0.020
employment rate -0.099 0.059 -0.110 0.047 0.012 0.052 -0.016 -0.173 0.162 -0.151 0.131 -0.101 0.132 0.132
total employment (3) twelfth 0.635 0.184 0.590 0.181 0.242 0.132 0.174 0.766 0.335 0.633 0.350 0.070 0.235 0.051
hours worked difference 0.414 0.164 0.379 0.162 0.217 0.109 0.215 0.462 0.293 0.296 0.308 0.229 0.211 0.227
employment rate 0.222 0.081 0.211 0.080 0.052 0.053 0.034 0.304 0.147 0.337 0.145 -0.063 0.089 -0.042
total employment (4) first and 0.907 0.166 0.956 0.171 0.228 0.126 -0.059 -0.145 0.502 0.077 0.500 -0.211 0.346 0.053
hours worked twelfth 0.954 0.163 0.975 0.168 0.192 0.111 -0.035 -0.338 0.504 -0.087 0.505 -0.188 0.325 0.032
employment rate difference -0.047 0.046 -0.019 0.043 0.008 0.043 -0.006 0.194 0.149 0.164 0.145 -0.071 0.112 0.056
2 - IV: subsistence minimum wage 5 - IV: voting data interacted with voting dummy and voting cycle
total employment (1) levels -0.263 0.415 0.981 0.787 0.149 0.656 0.079 -0.434 0.268 -0.029 0.267 0.424 0.268 0.185
hours worked 0.226 0.354 0.976 0.672 0.219 0.614 0.119 -0.109 0.217 0.192 0.222 0.380 0.228 0.158
employment rate -0.489 0.167 0.006 0.309 -0.232 0.191 -0.128 -0.326 0.136 -0.220 0.130 0.039 0.081 0.014
total employment (2) first -1.082 0.591 -0.471 0.555 -0.352 0.398 0.090 -1.050 0.764 -0.745 0.793 0.105 0.614 -0.017
hours worked difference -0.573 0.549 -0.184 0.516 -0.177 0.375 0.021 -0.337 0.669 -0.285 0.714 -0.081 0.551 0.014
employment rate -0.508 0.147 -0.287 0.118 -0.120 0.103 0.158 -0.714 0.275 -0.460 0.239 -0.193 0.200 0.146
total employment (3) twelfth -0.043 0.346 0.321 0.325 -0.064 0.263 -0.046 0.402 0.497 0.475 0.486 -0.059 0.295 -0.030
hours worked difference 0.089 0.303 0.195 0.291 0.169 0.224 0.168 0.319 0.413 0.486 0.408 -0.003 0.260 0.089
employment rate -0.132 0.169 0.126 0.144 -0.231 0.095 -0.151 0.083 0.246 -0.011 0.228 -0.107 0.108 -0.067
total employment (4) first and -0.754 0.540 -0.258 0.546 0.202 0.273 -0.053 0.594 0.796 0.937 0.780 -0.564 0.507 0.166
hours worked twelfth -0.317 0.524 -0.088 0.540 0.292 0.265 -0.054 1.411 0.802 1.628 0.797 -0.587 0.501 0.129
employment rate difference -0.437 0.127 -0.170 0.117 -0.201 0.090 0.160 -0.817 0.208 -0.691 0.198 -0.229 0.118 0.125
3 - IV: interaction-free political instruments 6 - IV: election data interacted with election cycle and real minimum wage
total employment (1) levels -0.370 0.148 -0.317 0.148 0.156 0.136 0.083 -0.333 0.327 -0.423 0.308 0.161 0.241 0.085
hours worked 0.068 0.124 0.075 0.127 0.140 0.117 0.076 -0.115 0.283 -0.181 0.270 0.138 0.203 0.075
employment rate -0.438 0.070 -0.392 0.064 0.033 0.045 0.017 -0.218 0.104 -0.242 0.093 -0.032 0.061 -0.017
total employment (2) first 0.142 0.297 0.198 0.295 0.022 0.297 -0.006 0.378 0.647 0.441 0.695 -0.753 0.698 0.190
hours worked difference 0.346 0.287 0.442 0.282 0.176 0.270 -0.021 0.318 0.643 0.428 0.679 -0.433 0.624 0.050
employment rate -0.204 0.079 -0.244 0.070 -0.106 0.089 0.141 0.060 0.202 0.013 0.176 -0.168 0.149 0.222
total employment (3) twelfth 0.329 0.200 0.307 0.200 -0.161 0.161 -0.115 0.540 0.546 0.608 0.545 -0.335 0.407 -0.239
hours worked difference 0.234 0.187 0.219 0.188 0.070 0.142 0.070 -0.180 0.495 0.011 0.485 0.005 0.355 0.005
employment rate 0.094 0.084 0.088 0.080 -0.131 0.061 -0.086 0.720 0.222 0.597 0.204 -0.222 0.116 -0.145
total employment (4) first and 0.666 0.315 0.814 0.312 -0.230 0.244 0.056 0.051 0.658 0.518 0.671 -0.768 0.765 0.181
hours worked twelfth 0.880 0.315 1.037 0.307 0.040 0.206 -0.007 0.059 0.636 0.520 0.645 -0.242 0.599 0.041
employment rate difference -0.214 0.071 -0.223 0.070 -0.235 0.077 0.185- 0.008 0.192 -0.002 0.178 0.078 0.177 -0.061
1) The dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employment rate.  Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic model.
2) Column 1 shows the base specification with region and time fixed (and past inflation); column 2 adds controls to the base specification;  and column 3 adds controls and dynamics (24 lags of the independent variable).  Column 4 shows the long run 
     coefficient associated to the model in column 3.  Each comun shows Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break dummies.  Controls are population and institutional factors.
3) Spike is endogeneous.  Panel 1 shows uninstrumented, and panels 2 to 6 show instrumented estimates using lags of spike and political variables as instruments.  Each panel has four rows:  (1) within groups (levels),  (2) first differences, (3) twefth 
     differences, and (4) first and twelfth differences.
4) Because a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage increases spike by 0.3 percentage points, all estimates were multiplied by 0.3 (see Section 4).
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Tabl e B - ESTI MATES OF THE COEFFI CI ENT OF THE SPI KE
fixed effects controls dynamics
dependent data filter Sd f Hs e Fd fS d f Hs e Fd fS d f Hs e Fd f
variable (1) (2) (3)
1 - IV: lagged spike
hours worked (1) levels 51.68 11 0.27 0.17 181.27 48/1013 69.14 11 0.23 0.17 133.96 66/995 42.72 11 0.30 0.16 89.46 88/901
employment rate 69.06 11 0.08 0.08 181.27 48/1013 73.23 11 0.09 0.08 133.96 66/995 19.28 11 -0.02 0.05 83.71 88/901
hours worked (2) first 29.88 11 -0.24 0.23 8.99 48/1013 27.04 11 -0.16 0.23 7.91 66/995 24.99 11 -0.13 0.20 6.35 88/895
employment rate difference 18.20 11 0.02 0.07 8.99 48/1013 10.51 11 0.05 0.06 7.91 66/995 16.86 11 0.03 0.03 33.21 88/895
hours worked (3) twelfth 59.94 11 0.09 0.20 30.12 46/943 65.87 11 0.12 0.20 22.70 64/925 30.38 11 0.17 0.14 17.01 87/830
employment rate difference 78.19 11 -0.19 0.10 30.12 46/943 72.78 11 -0.18 0.10 22.70 64/925 16.12 11 -0.10 0.06 16.64 87/830
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 49.97 11 -0.37 0.20 12.59 46/943 46.33 11 0.36 0.20 10.42 64/925 33.73 11 0.20 0.15 8.79 86/825
employment rate difference 17.41 11 0.00 0.06 12.59 46/943 13.67 11 -0.01 0.06 10.42 64/925 22.13 11 -0.07 0.06 8.46 86/825
2 - IV: subsistence minimum wage
hours worked (1) levels 45.05 12 -0.11 0.37 73.92 49/1012 32.75 12 -0.89 0.64 56.09 67/994 25.35 12 -0.02 0.61 34.82 89/900
employment rate 85.17 12 0.24 0.17 73.92 49/1012 59.13 12 -0.27 0.31 56.09 67/994 65.23 12 0.21 0.19 39.46 89/900
hours worked (2) first 26.04 12 1.25 0.53 3.68 49/1006 26.89 12 0.86 0.51 3.06 67/988 24.69 12 0.65 0.39 3.15 89/894
employment rate difference 33.19 12 0.45 0.14 3.68 49/1006 42.19 12 0.24 0.12 3.06 67/988 58.28 12 0.03 0.02 31.35 89/894
hours worked (3) twelfth 33.47 12 0.41 0.32 12.39 47/942 44.99 12 0.29 0.31 9.51 65/924 61.18 12 0.18 0.24 8.76 88/829
employment rate difference 59.78 12 0.25 0.18 12.39 47/942 56.13 12 -0.03 0.16 9.51 65/924 47.80 12 0.24 0.09 7.77 88/829
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 70.91 12 1.18 0.49 2.03 47/936 68.80 12 0.95 0.52 1.75 65/918 69.93 12 0.03 0.27 3.63 87/824
employment rate difference 28.98 12 0.43 0.13 2.03 47/936 27.09 12 0.17 0.12 1.75 65/918 46.46 12 0.19 0.09 1.90 87/824
3 - IV: interaction-free political instrum ents
hours worked (1) levels 236.42 74 0.23 0.15 78.61 109/1015 234.23 74 0.20 0.15 74.37 127/985 156.26 74 0.11 0.14 41.47 148/832
employment rate 410.33 74 0.33 0.09 78.61 109/1015 413.11 74 0.27 0.09 74.37 127/985 124.18 74 -0.09 0.06 42.79 148/832
hours worked (2) first 80.70 74 0.26 0.31 7.01 108/1015 85.06 74 0.34 0.30 5.82 126/985 116.11 74 0.28 0.29 2.78 147/826
employment rate difference 80.59 74 0.11 0.09 7.01 108/1015 60.56 74 0.20 0.07 5.82 126/985 110.54 74 -0.01 0.03 44.39 148/826
hours worked (3) twelfth 149.96 74 0.30 0.20 9.43 108/944 141.42 74 0.31 0.20 7.82 126/920 143.40 74 0.34 0.15 9.54 146/761
employment rate difference 266.38 74 0.01 0.09 9.43 108/944 272.78 74 0.01 0.09 7.82 126/920 150.64 74 0.16 0.07 7.51 147/761
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 154.64 74 -0.08 0.33 5.04 108/944 160.98 74 -0.23 0.32 4.57 125/920 115.83 74 0.31 0.22 3.23 146/756
employment rate difference 107.38 74 0.16 0.08 5.04 108/944 94.45 74 0.19 0.08 4.57 125/920 110.95 74 0.23 0.08 3.24 146/756
4 - IV: interaction-free whose correlation with spike was higher than 0.30
hours worked (1) levels 143.65 25 -0.07 0.18 129.24 63/1070 142.64 25 -0.11 0.18 97.95 81/1040 54.04 25 0.01 0.15 61.72 102/887
employment rate 254.32 25 0.37 0.12 129.24 63/1070 243.92 25 0.37 0.11 97.95 81/1040 40.19 25 -0.10 0.07 59.07 102/887
hours worked (2) first 24.59 25 0.45 0.50 3.61 63/1070 20.82 25 0.31 0.49 3.12 81/1040 40.21 25 0.27 0.43 2.68 102/881
employment rate difference 19.32 25 0.12 0.17 3.61 63/1070 13.30 25 0.08 0.13 3.12 81/1040 37.78 25 0.00 0.03 54.52 102/881
hours worked (3) twelfth 54.54 25 0.00 0.30 12.60 62/999 45.72 25 0.17 0.31 9.84 80/975 66.44 25 0.11 0.22 7.31 101/816
employment rate difference 158.56 25 -0.22 0.15 12.60 62/999 166.80 25 -0.26 0.15 9.84 80/975 56.35 25 0.06 0.09 6.95 101/816
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 30.51 25 1.23 0.51 1.08 62/999 33.60 25 0.97 0.52 1.07 80/975 43.35 25 0.53 0.33 2.89 100/811
employment rate difference 28.47 25 -0.28 0.15 1.08 62/999 28.46 25 -0.24 0.14 1.07 80/975 33.73 25 0.04 0.11 1.36 100/811
5 - IV: voting data interacted with voting dummy and voting cycle
hours worked (1) levels 67.17 11 0.35 0.22 103.91 53/1080 69.95 11 0.00 0.23 74.54 71/1050 19.75 11 -0.20 0.23 40.59 92/897
employment rate 142.88 11 0.10 0.15 103.91 53/1080 165.52 11 -0.01 0.14 74.54 71/1050 20.83 11 -0.07 0.08 42.64 92/897
hours worked (2) first 2.66 11 1.06 0.66 3.80 53/1080 2.93 11 1.04 0.70 3.16 71/1050 9.59 11 0.52 0.55 2.61 92/891
employment rate difference 7.49 11 0.66 0.23 3.80 53/1080 4.53 11 0.39 0.21 3.16 71/1050 5.44 11 0.02 0.03 35.40 92/891
hours worked (3) twelfth 10.72 11 0.15 0.42 14.35 52/1009 13.87 11 -0.03 0.41 11.09 70/985 17.65 11 0.36 0.26 7.21 91/826
employment rate difference 110.20 11 0.02 0.25 14.35 52/1009 112.76 11 0.11 0.23 11.09 70/985 24.61 11 0.10 0.11 7.33 91/826
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 5.69 11 -0.60 0.81 1.30 52/1009 5.47 11 0.81 0.80 1.22 70/985 28.37 11 0.93 0.47 3.03 90/821
employment rate difference 5.91 11 0.76 0.17 1.30 52/1009 4.86 11 0.65 0.17 1.22 70/985 15.98 11 0.21 0.12 1.72 90/821
6 - IV: election data interacted with election cycle and real minimum wage
hours worked (1) levels 118.08 17 0.38 0.31 93.50 51/1078 123.60 17 0.45 0.30 69.20 69/1048 42.53 17 0.08 0.23 39.55 90/895
employment rate 145.00 17 -0.02 0.12 93.50 51/1078 146.31 17 0.01 0.11 69.20 69/1048 34.35 17 0.01 0.07 40.78 90/895
hours worked (2) first 12.94 17 0.33 0.66 4.02 51/1078 14.48 17 0.32 0.68 3.19 69/1048 21.05 17 0.89 0.58 2.61 90/889
employment rate difference 8.80 17 -0.15 0.19 4.02 51/1078 7.92 17 -0.09 0.17 3.19 69/1048 26.67 17 0.03 0.03 34.11 90/889
hours worked (3) twelfth 27.48 17 0.68 0.48 12.42 50/1007 26.47 17 0.47 0.47 9.43 68/983 31.45 17 0.34 0.35 6.04 89/824
employment rate difference 94.84 17 -0.65 0.21 12.42 50/1007 103.54 17 -0.53 0.20 9.43 68/983 46.92 17 0.22 0.11 5.88 89/824
hours worked (4) first and twelfth 14.00 17 0.76 0.63 0.85 50/1007 13.50 17 0.33 0.66 0.91 68/983 16.91 17 0.57 0.55 2.89 88/819
employment rate difference 13.61 17 -0.07 0.19 0.85 50/1007 12.60 17 -0.06 0.18 0.91 68/983 14.86 17 -0.11 0.18 1.33 88/819
1) The dependent variable is average hours worked for the working population, average hours worked for those employed and employm ent rate.  
    Hours and Job elasticities add to Total elasticity for the static but not for the dynamic model.
2) Column 1 shows the base specification with region and time fixed (and past inflation); column 2 adds controls to the base specification;  
     and column 3 adds controls and dynamics (24 lags of the independent variable).  Column 4 shows the long run coefficient associated
      to the model in column 3.  Each comun shows Time effects are modelled with year, seasonal-month, stabilization and 1988 structural break 
      dummies.  Controls are population and institutional factors.
3) Each column shows the spike coefficient and associated standard errors, Sargan test, Hausman test and 
     F test (step of the 2SLS).   Degree of freedom for Sargan and F test are indicated.  Standard errors for Hausman test are indicated.
4) Spike is endogeneous.  Panels 2-6 show instrumented estimates using lags of spike and political variables as instruments.  Each panel has 
      four row s:  (1) w ithin groups (levels),  (2) first differences, (3) tw efth differences, and (4) first and tw elfth differences.
5) For full estimates see Table A in the Appendix.  Because a 10% increase in the nominal minimum wage increases spike by 0.3 percentage 
     points, all estim ates w ere m ultiplied by 0.3 (see Section 4).
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